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THE PER SE RULE:
ALIVE AND WELL AND LIVING IN CATALANO
Richard J. Favretto*
The antitrust plaintiff's favorite rule of liability-the per se
rule-has through the years served as the cornerstone of substantive
analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Recently, however, the
Rule has been rumored to be undergoing hard times in the courts.
Such a development, if true, would be of no mean significance to the
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice. The
scope and application of the per se rule to a given set of facts frequently is the focus of many of the cases with which the Division deals
on a day to day basis. The propriety of characterizing a course of conduct as subject to per se liability often determines whether or not a
case is appropriate for criminal prosecution. Moreover, even in the
civil area, the scope of the per se rule becomes a key factor in structuring the government's approach to litigation.
After the change in membership of the Supreme Court during the
days of Chief Justice Warren, and particularly after the Supreme
Court's opinions in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,'
and, more recently, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. ,2 many antitrust conferences began predicting the imminent erosion and demise of the per se rule as a tool of antitrust
analysis. Many lawyers around the country began, depending upon
their perspective, either gleefully or despondently anticipating the
ultimate narrowing and perhaps judicial repeal of the per se rule in all
but the most extreme cases of anticompetitive purpose and effect. To
paraphrase Mark Twain, these reports of death of the per se rule have
been grossly exaggerated. Indeed, this fundamental tool of Sherman
Act analysis continues to endure and even flourish.
The per se rule acts as a conclusive presumption that certain practices that generally lack any redeeming competitive virtue because they
are so plainly anticompetitive, are illegal without further inquiry or examination. 3 Of course, applying the per se rule requires characterizing
*Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division-U.S. Dep't of Justice.
B.A., Iona College, 1963; LL.B., Catholic University Law School, 1966. Paper
originally delivered before the 1980 Lyle P. Jones Antitrust Conference, Vacation
Village Hotel, San Diego, California.
1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). See Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44
ALB. L. REv. 1 (1979).
3. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See generally 1
E. KITNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 8.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as KITNER].
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the challenged conduct within a category of behavior which has been,
or should be, presumed unlawful. Often this characterization merely
involves analyzing the practice on its face. Sometimes, however, where
a less direct or obvious restraint is involved, a more detailed assessment of the conduct is necessary.' This process of characterization in
per se cases should not be confused with whether the rule itself remains
intact.
Increasingly, the reasons for the original adoption and evolution of
the per se rule maintain today. The rule fulfills the dual purposes of
judicial economy and business certainty, objectives which are increasingly important in today's complex and evolving economic system. Far
from being eroded or attenuated, the rule stands as firmly as ever
against the variety of clear cut anticompetitive restraints that it embraces.' The rule, far from being narrowed, should be expanded where
appropriate to achieve the purposes for which it has been widely
recognized through the years. In an era of already too-complex litigation, the per se rule should and will play a major role in future antitrust litigation.
After the Supreme Court's opinion in Continental T. V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., many lawyers, both defense and plaintiff,
predicted an era of judicial hostility to the per se rule and a trend
toward additional economic analysis in antitrust litigation. Consequently, many antitrust cases would become encumbered in an incredibly complex economic analysis that would be incomprehensible to
jurors. Nevertheless, GTE Sylvania and subsequent cases carry no such
message. The recent Supreme Court decision in Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc.7 demonstrates the contrary.
GTE Sylvania represents no more than a statement by the Supreme
Court concerning the inadvisability of extending the per se rule to vertical territorial and customer restrictions. The Supreme Court's refusal
to expand the per se rule was foreseeable because United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,' in extending the per se rule to vertical
restraints, had surprisingly accomplished what the court refused to do
only four years earlier in White Motor Co. v. United States.9 Because
4. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965). Professor Bork traces the origins of the
Rule of Reason and explores the divergent views of the Court.

5. See note 3 supra.
6.
7.
8.
U.S. 36
9.

433 U.S. 36 (1977).
100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980).
388 U.S. 365 (1967), rev'd, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
(1977).
372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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the Schwinn doctrine proved unworkable, however, lower courts
sought artificial distinctions to circumvent Schwinn in situations where
its application imposed harsh and perhaps anticompetitive results.
In GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court merely conceded that extending the per se rule in Schwinn to a new category of conduct had been
accomplished through an insufficient foundation of judicial experience
with the practice in question and by an inadequate analysis of the
underlying economic and business justifications. Thus, in GTE Sylvania, the issue was more one involving the necessary basis for the extension of the rule to a new category of business activity rather than
the application of the rule to an already established category of per se
unlawful conduct.
The Court in GTE Sylvania did not, however, foreclose the extension of the per se rule to appropriate cases involving vertical nonprice
restraints. Rather, the Court indicated that such particular applications
should be made on the basis of hard economic analysis instead of the
"formalistic line drawing',' 0 undertaken in Schwinn. Since GTE
Sylvania, some lower courts have continued to characterize vertically
imposed customer and territorial restrictions as per se unlawful in
given factual circumstances."
The GTE Sylvania Court affirmed, rather than eroded, the
significance of the per se rule when it recognized the continued validity
of the per se rule for resale price agreements and when it endorsed the
per se rule in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. " for horizontal
territorial restrictions. 13 Recently, in CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.," the Supreme Court again confirmed the validity of the per se rule for resale price fixing. For these
reasons, GTE Sylvania is much less credible support for arguing that
the viability of the per se rule is fading.
Another recent case that has tended to support critics of the per se
rule is Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
(ASCAP).I 5 ASCAP did not, however, attenuate the per se doctrine.
Instead, ASCAP involved characterization, an issue that turns on the
particular facts of any given case: Is the conduct in question a species
of activity that falls into a per se category?
In ASCAP, the Court essentially stated that the practice of
marketing a blanket copyright license was not a horizontal combina10.

433 U.S. at 59.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

E.g., Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 459 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
433 U.S. at 51, n.18 and 58, n.28.
100 S. Ct. 937 (1980).
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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tion to fix prices. Rather, the Court declared that the practice was a
joint venture formed to market a product that could not otherwise exist and that the pricing mechanism for that product was a necessary
consequence of the joint venture activity.'"
In a sense, the ASCAP Court viewed the activity in question as the
creation of a new product by joint venture partners. Determining the
price of that product necessarily constituted a joint effort by the venturers, but not a horizontal agreement among competing sellers of the
same product. Thus the arrangement, whatever its competitive significance, should be determined according to a rule of reason analysis.
Nowhere in ASCAP, however, does the Court retreat from the propriety of per se rules in antitrust litigation. Indeed, the Court recognized the utility and necessity of per se antitrust analysis" by citing the
famous language in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States.
Another recent Supreme Court decision which supports the general
validity of per se analysis, has been cited by commentators as signifying the Supreme Court's suspicion about per se rules. In National
Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States,'8 the Court struck
down a competitive bidding restraint embodied in a professional society's canon of ethics, as unlawful on its face without requiring
elaborate industry analysis to demonstrate the anticompetitive
character of the canon.' 9 Because the Court extensively discussed the
parameters of a rule of reason analysis and its failure to explicitly
characterize the restraint in that case as a per se violation, Professional
Engineershas been interpreted as an indication of the Supreme Court's
reluctance to apply a per se analysis to indirect pricing restraints.20
Both the district court and the circuit court had no trouble
characterizing the ProfessionalEngineers restraint as unlawful per se.2 '
16. Id. at 20-24.
17. Id. at 8, n.ll (citing Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5

(1958)).

18. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
19. Id. at 692-93.
20. See R. POSNER, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on Gypsum and
Engineers Decisions, 1187 (1979); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments-1979,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13-27 (1980); Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments:
Defining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of
Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265, 302 (1979).
21. United States v. Nat'l Soc'y. of Professional Engineers, 389 F. Supp. 1193
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd (rev'd on other grounds) 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd,

435 U.S. 679 (1978). Judge Smith made separate findings of fact and law. The court
concluded that § 11(c) of the National Society of Professional Engineer's Code of
Ethics:
[Pirohibits defendant's [Society] members from engaging in any form of price
competition when offering their services; selection is restricted to considerations
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/3
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Extensive findings of fact had demonstrated the plainly anticompetitive nature and scope of the competitive bidding ban and had convinced the lower courts that per se characterization was appropriate. A
fair reading of the Supreme Court's opinion indicates that the Court
was applying, in substance, a per se rule to the practice in question and
affirming the analysis of the lower courts in that case. Although the
Court stated that the practice did not constitute price fixing as such,
the Court concluded that the competitive bidding ban was unlawful on
its face." Because the Court deemed the justifications urged by the
defendant in Professional Engineers to be irrelevant even under the
rule of reason test, some have argued that the Court's discussion of
that issue implies that the case involved a rule of reason analysis. I do
not believe this is correct. Although the words "per se" are not used to
describe the violation, the analysis of the restraint as being unlawful on
its face without requiring elaborate industry inquiry certainly suggests
that the Court treated the restriction as a per se violation. This is the
interpretation the opinion has received from lower courts dealing with
competitive bidding restraints in other contexts.23
of reputation and ability. No fee information may be given a prospective client
which takes the form of cost estimates or other proposals in terms of dollars, man
days of work required, or percentage of construction cost which can be compared
to that of another engineer.
Id. at 1200. The court specifically held in the third conclusion of law that § 1 (c) has as
its purpose and effect "the suppression and elimination of price competition for the
sale of engineering services in per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 1216
(citations omitted).
The court of appeals in United States v. Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Engineers, 555
F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), affirmed in part and remanded with instructions to limit the
district court's holding that the society must "state affirmatively that it does not consider competitive bidding to be unethical." Id. at 984. because the order is overly intrusive into protected first amendment freedoms than is necessary to protect governmental interests. The court of appeals did affirm, however, the district court's holding
that the ethical canon was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
"Defendant's prohibition of competitive bidding, by blocking the free flow of price information, strikes at the functioning of the free market. The Society may not have
engaged in direct price fixing as such, but its prohibition of free price competition is
not far removed, in both legal and practical consequence." Id. at 981.
22. 435 U.S. at 692-93.
23. E.g., United States v. Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 464 F. Supp.
400 (W.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 262 (1979). The decision in ProfessionalEngineers signified a major victory for
antitrust enforcement for the appropriate analysis to be instituted under the rule of
reason. In that case, the Court finally clarified the test of Sherman Act legality in a
rule of reason case: the procompetitive and anticompetitive aspects of the practice in
question are balanced against each other. Other considerations of social policy, absent
statutory exemption from the Sherman Act, simply are irrelevant in a rule of reason
case. This opinion clarified the reach of the Sherman Act in cases presenting more ambiguous competitive practices where the immediate anticompetitive impact or purpose
Published by eCommons, 1981
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The most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the per
se rule came in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.2 4 In Catalano, the
Court said that it was not retreating from the application of the per se
rule to pricing restraints of whatever nature. In an impressive affirmation of the basic doctrine enunciated in United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co. ,"' the Court addressed the question whether an agreement restricting the extension of credit was a per se restraint. The
Court's per curiam opinion, rendered with neither full briefs on the
merits nor oral argument, summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit. The
Court held that a horizontal agreement to terminate the practice of giving credit is tantamount to an agreement to eliminate discounts that
falls squarely within the traditional per se rule against price fixing. The
short shrift that the Supreme Court afforded Catalanoshould resolve
any doubts about the continuing validity of the per se rule. Furthermore, the Court's citation of ProfessionalEngineers in Catalanoas illustrating the type of indirect pricing agreements that it has formerly
held unlawful per se, supports an interpretation of Professional
Engineers as a per se case.2
The Department of Justice views Catalano as a ringing endorsement of the per se rule in cases involving pricing restraints. Additionally, Catalano reaffirms the Court's long-standing reliance on per se
analysis in other antitrust cases and supports a per se enforcement
policy in cases involving horizontal territorial division, boycotts, and
other practices traditionally subject to per se treatment. 7 As business
practices become more sophisticated, and as the anticompetitive impact becomes less clear in particular cases, the litigation battle may
well focus on appropriate characterization of the practice in question.
Prosecutors and plaintiffs should be ready for this; but such difficulties in cases involving indirect restraints have always existed. These
realities of a sophisticated economic system and the dynamics of antitrust litigation, however, should not be interpreted as a retreat from
the per se rule. The Sherman Act is amazingly flexible and adaptable.
is unclear. Although the competitive effect of such restrictions may need to be
measured against the peculiar industry context and surrounding circumstances, the
bottom line of legality is the competitive significance of the restraint. It is in this area
that Professional Engineers will have its widest and most lasting impact. Its explication
of the rule of reason is a procompetitive, proenforcement articulation of the basic
policy underlying the Sherman Act.
24. 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980) (per curiam).
25. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
26. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1925, 1927 (1980).
27.

See generally KITNER, supra note 3.
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At the same time, however, its basic principles remain constant and
fundamental.
The process of properly characterizing a practice will ultimately
turn on good, old-fashioned common sense, and that, after all, is what
the per se rule is all about. The courts will continue to foreclose
specious arguments defending agreements, the anticompetitive nature
of which, is apparent. For example, the CatalanoCourt summarily rejected the defendants' argument that the credit restriction in that case
increased the certainty of consumer information about prices and
made entry more feasible for potential competitors.28 As the Court
recognized, to permit such arguments in defense of agreements tampering with competitive pricing would stand the antitrust laws on their
head.
Catalano should quiet the rumors about the imminent demise of
the per se rule. That case and the others previously considered indicate
a healthy future for the per se rule as a tool of judicial analysis and
antitrust enforcement. Predictions after GTE Sylvania, ASCAP, and
the Ninth Circuit opinion in Catalano, that litigation on the merits in
section 1 cases would become hopeless contests between industry experts, economic experts, and other prognosticators, were no more than
wishful thinking on the part of many and hand wringing on the part of
some.
Lawyers have occasionally despaired at the seeming willingness of
some lower courts to eschew per se analysis in favor of what was
perceived as a Supreme Court invitation to engage in difficult economic analysis in almost every antitrust case. Furthermore, some private
lawyers have doubted the ability of plaintiffs to prove liability in a case
depending upon a per se characterization. These predictions probably
will never materialize. Instead, the Supreme Court in Catalano has
sounded a message that the lower courts should more closely scrutinize
ProfessionalEngineers, ASCAP and GTE Sylvania, and confirm what
has proven to be sound and effective judicial reliance upon the per se
rule. Although the characterization of a particular practice in a particular case may be disputed, no question should remain about the
continued validity of the per se rule in antitrust litigation.
28.

100 S. Ct. at 1928.
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